Our purpose is to exhibit a modular systematic method of representing non{ monotonic reasoning problems with the Well Founded Semantics WFS of extended logic programs augmented with eXplicit negation (WFSX), augmented by its Contradiction Removal Semantics (CRSX) when needed. We apply this semantics, and its contradiction removal semantics counterpart, to represent non-monotonic reasoning problems. We show how to cast in the language of logic programs extended with explicit negation such forms of non-monotonic reasoning as defeasible reasoning, abductive reasoning and hypothetical reasoning and apply them to such di erent domains of knowledge representation as hierarchies and reasoning about actions. We then abstract a modular systematic method of representing non-monotonic problems in a logic programming semantics comprising two forms of negation avoiding some drawbacks of other proposals, with which we relate our work.
Introduction
Recently, several authors have stressed and showed the importance of having an explicit second kind of negation within logic programs, for use in deductive databases, knowledge representation, and non{monotonic reasoning 3, 6, 11, 18, 16, 32, 33, 34, 43, 39] . In non{monotonic reasoning with logic programming there are two main ways of giving meaning to sets of rules when a given semantics is assigned to a program de ned by the set of rules. We either accept as consequences the intersection of all models identi ed by some semantics, which is called skeptical reasoning 21, 2], or we consider one particular model identifying the consequences of a given set of assumptions -this form of reasoning is called brave reasoning in 21] .
It has been argued 33, 34, 32, 31] that semantics with the well founded property are adequate to capture non{monotonic reasoning if we interpret the least model provided by the semantics (called the Well Founded Model) as the skeptical view of the world and the other models (called Extended Stable Models) as alternative enlarged consistent belief sets standing for di erent possibilities of brave reasoning. A consequence of the well founded property is that intersection of all models identi ed by the semantics is itself a model belonging to the semantics. Thus proof procedures for capturing skeptical reasoning may be related to one model in the semantics { or equivalently to validity in all models { thus properly recasting the classic logical notion of entailment in logic programming. This is the case with Przymusinski's Extended Stable Model semantics 37].
Some proposals for extending logic programming semantics with a second kind of negation has been proposed. One such extension is the Answer Set semantics 6], which is shown to be an extension of Stable Model (SM) semantics 5] from the class of logic programs 20] to the class of logic programs with a second form of negation. In 18] another proposal for such extension is introduced, based on the SM semantics, where implicitly a preference for negative information (exceptions) over positive information is assumed. However SM semantics is not well founded and even if the meaning of the program is de ned as the intersection of all stable models, it is known that the computation of this intersection is computationally expensive. Another extension to include a second kind of negation is suggested by Przymusinski in 38] . Although the set of models identi ed by this extension enjoys the well founded property, it gives some less intuitive results 1] with respect to the coexistence of both forms of negation. Based on the XSM semantics Przymusinski 39] also introduces the Stationary semantics where the second form of negation is classical negation. Unfortunately, classical negation also implies that the logic programs under Stationary semantics no longer admit a procedural reading.
Well Founded Semantics with Explicit Negation (WFSX) 26] is an extension to Well Founded Semantics 42] (WFS) including a second form of negation called explicit negation, preserving the well founded property. Furthermore, explicit negation is characterized by that, in any model, whatever the classical literal l, l^:l never holds, and by that whenever :l holds l, the negation by default or implicit negation of l also holds, and l is false, thus avoiding the less intuitive results concerning the relation between the two forms of negation. However, l _ :l is not mandatory, so the ability is kept for the truth value of some literals to remain unde ned (cf. 1] for other approaches).
When a second form of negation is introduced contradiction may be present (i.e. l and :l hold for some l) and no semantics is given by WFSX 1 .
In 29] the authors de ne CRSX extending WFSX by introducing the notion of removing some contradictions and identifying the models obtained by revising closed world assumptions supporting those contradictions. One unique model, if any such revised model exists, is singled out as the contradiction free semantics. When no contradiction is present CRSX semantics reduces to WFSX semantics.
Furthermore, under WFSX programs admit a procedural logic programming reading, which is not the case if truly classical negation plus material implication are used, as in 39] , where case analysis is condoned. Under WFSX rules in the program are unidirectional (contrapositives are not implicit), maintaining the procedural avour; the rule connective, , is not material implication, but is rather like an inference rule.
Here we show how to cast in the language of logic programs extended with explicit negation di erent forms of non-monotonic reasoning such as defeasible reasoning, abductive reasoning and hypothetical reasoning, and apply it to diverse domains of knowledge representation such as hierarchies and reasoning about actions.
Our main purpose is to abstract out and exhibit a modular and systematic method of representing non{monotonic reasoning problems with our CRSX semantics of logic programs. We argue that Logic Programming extended with the concept of unde nedness and a suitable form of explicit negation, is very rich to represent such problems. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review CRSX semantics 29] which is an extension of the (WFSX) 26] for programs which have no WFSX semantics. Then we identify simple forms of commonsense reasoning (e.g. defeasible reasoning with exceptions, hypothetical reasoning) and show how they are represented by logic programs when CRSX is used. Using the notion of defeasibility and exception rules we then show how to formalize hierarchical reasoning where exceptions are also present. Next we represent problems where hypothetical reasoning is used to capture brave reasoning.
Afterwards we use our approach to represent additional classical non{monotonic problems in reasoning about actions, arguing that it is su ciently generic. Then, grounded on the former examples, we abstract a systematization of our problem representation methodology. Finally we mention and compare with related work. 1 In 30, 31] it is shown how WFSX relates to default theory.
CRSX Review
In this section we review a method for giving meaning to extended logic programs applicable whenever WFSX is taken as the semantics and the program is contradictory. We rst review WFSX semantics 26] and next the method for revising contradictory programs 29].
Language Used
Given a rst order language Lang, an extended logic program is a set of rules of the form H B 1 ; : : : ; B n ; C 1 ; : : : ; C m m 0; n 0, where H; B 1 ; : : : ; B n ; C . L is called a default literal. Literals are either classical or default literals. A set of rules stands for all its ground instances w.r.t. Lang. When (n = m = 0) we may simply write H instead of H : If S is a set of literals we say S is contradictory i there is an atom L such that fL; :Lg S. In this case we also say that S is contradictory w.r.t. L. If S is a set by S we mean the set f LjL 2 Sg:
WFSX overview
In this section we brie y review WFSX Well Founded Semantics for logic programs extended with eXplicit negation. For full details and the relation with default logic the reader is referred to 26, 30, 31] . WFSX follows from WFS plus one basic "coherence" requirement: :L entails L (if L is explicitly false, L must be false) for any literal L: Example 1. Take program P = fa b ; b a ; :a g. If :a is simply envisaged as a new atom symbol, say a 0 (as suggested in 38]), and well founded semantics 42] is used to de ne the semantics of P, the meaning of P is f:a; :bg, so that :a is true and a is unde ned. We insist that a should hold because :a does. Accordingly, the WFSX semantics of P is f:a; b; a; :bg, since b follows from a. 2
Intuitively this can be construed as there existing an inference rule :L ) L
This designation has been used in the literature instead of the more operational "negation as failure (to prove)". Another appropriate designation is "implicit negation", in contradistinction to explicit negation. When :A is treated as a new predicate symbol in the way as suggested in 38] we call it pseudo{negation. A comparison among di erent two types of negation in logic programming can be found in 1].
stating that whenever :L holds L must also hold 3 , i.e. if :L is true L is false. De nition 2.1 (Interpretation). By an interpretation I of a language Lang we mean any set T F, where T and F are disjoint subsets of classical ground literals over the Herbrand base, and if :L 2 T then L 2 F (coherence) 4 . The set T contains all ground classical literals true in I, the set F contains all ground classical literals false in I. The truth value of the remaining classical literals is unde ned (the truth value of a default literal L is the 3-valued complement 5 of L). To account for coherence we next extend with an additional rule the P modulo I transformation of 36], itself an extension of the Gelfond-Lifschitz modulo transformation:
De nition 2.2 (P=I transformation). Let P be an extended logic program and let I be an interpretation. By P=I we mean a program obtained from P by performing the following four operations, of which the second only is novel:
Remove all rules containing a default premise L such that L 2 I. Remove all rules with a non{default premise L (resp. :L) such that :L 2 I (resp. L 2 I).
Remove from all rules their default premises L such that L 2 I. Replace all the remaining default premises by proposition u 6 . The modi cation introduced is explained as follows: the second rule in the de nition has the e ect that if I is to be a model containing :L then it also must have L, by de nition of interpretation, and L is false. Since I may not be contradictory it does not have L and any rule with L in the body may thus be discarded. On the other hand there is no need for a rule removing default literals L such that :L 2 I because either I is coherent (see de nition below) and contains L and those literals will be taken into account by the third rule in the de nition, or I is not coherent and then it will not be a xed point.
The resulting program P=I is by de nition non{negative, and thus it always has a unique least(P=I) adapted from 36] (cf. its de nition in the appendix to this paper).
Note that least(P) is not always an interpretation in the sense of de nition 2.1. Conditions about noncontradiction and coherence may be violated. 3 Recall that since ::L L, expression (1) also means L ) :L. 4 For any literal L; if L is explicitly false L must be false. Note that the complementary condition "if L 2 T then :L 2 F" is implicit. 5 The 3-valued complement operation over the set ff, u, tg of truth values is de ned as t = f , f = t and u = u.
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The special proposition u is unde ned in all interpretations. De nition 2.6 (Contradictory program). An extended logic program P is contradictory i it has no semantics, i.e. there exists no interpretation I such that P (I) = I.
Revising contradictory extended logic programs
Here we review the semantics de ned in 29]. For full details, properties (including those regarding the minimality criterium), and for comparisons with other semantics, the reader is refered to that report. Once we introduce explicit negation programs are liable to be contradictory:
Example 5. Consider program P = fa ; :a bg. Since we have no clauses for b, by CWA it is natural to accept b as true. By the second rule in P we have :a, leading to an inconsistency with the fact a: Thus no set containing b may be a model of P. 2 We argue that the CWA may not be held of atom b since it leads to a contradiction (reductio ad absurdum). We show below how to revise 7 this form of contradiction, by making a suitable revision of the incorrect CWA on b. This semantics identi es fa; :ag as the intended meaning of P, where b is revised to unde ned. Assuming b false leads to a contradiction; revising it to true instead of to unde ned would not minimize the revised interpretation.
In order to revise possible contradictions we need to identify those contradictory sets implied by applications of CWA. The main idea is to compute all consequences of the program, even those leading to contradictions, as well as those arising from contradictions. The following example provides an intuitive preview of what we intend to capture: Example 6. Consider program P :
:a c (ii) e :a (iv) 7 We treat contradictory programs extending the approach of 27, 28]. De nition 2.7 (Pseudo{interpretation). A pseudo{interpretation (p{interpretation for short) is a possibly contradictory set of ground literals from the language of a program.
In the appendix, we extend the operator 36] from the class of interpretations to the class of p{interpretations, in order to de ne the pseudo well founded model (p{ model) as the set of all literals which are consequences of a (possibly contradictory) program.
Now we have to identify sets of default literals true by CWA, whose revision to unde ned can remove contradiction, by withdrawing the support of the CWAs on which the contradiction rests.
We must identify how the truth of a literal depends on the truth of other literals, i.e. how a literal L leans on a set of literals. These sets are called the dependency sets of L, DS(L): Intuitively 9 a classical literal A will be true if there is some rule in P with A as head such that all literals in its body are also true. A default literal A will be true if either it has no rules, or all rules in P with head A have a false body, or the classical literal :A is true. 8 This is not strictly necessary but simpli es the exposition. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we only consider rules ? L; :L for which rules for both L and :L exist in P. We also use the notation ? L to denote the head of rule ? L; :L. However it is not enough to establish how a literal depends on its dependency sets. We are interested in those dependency sets of a literal L which belong to the p{model, which means that L also belongs to the p{model. These sets are called the supports of L, i.e. :
De nition 2.8 (Support of a literal). A support SS M (L) w.r.t. a model M is a non{empty dependency set DS(L) such that DS(L) M: If there exists a SS M (L) we say that L is supported in M:
For simplicity, a support w.r.t. M P of P can be represented by SS(L): The notion of support can be extended to sets of literals:
De nition 2.9 (Support of a set of literals). A support SS M (fL 1 ; : : : ; L n g) w.r.t. a model M is:
For each combination k of j(i) there exists one support of the set of literals.
With the notion of support we are able to identify which literals support a contradiction, i.e. the literal ?: In order to remove a contradiction we must change the truth value of at least one literal from each support set of ?: One issue is for which literals we allow initiating change of their truth values; another is how to specify a notion of minimal change.
As mentioned before we only wish to initiate revision on default literals true by CWA, in a manner made precise later. To identify such revising literals we rst de ne:
De nition 2.10 (Default supported). A default literal A is default supported w.r.t. M if all supports SS M ( A) have only default literals. 2
Given the revisable literals we must nd those on which the contradiction rests. This is done simply by nding the supports of ? where the revisable literals occur only as leaves (these constitute the ?{assumption sets) { cf. de nition A.10 in the appendix.
In the examples shown later assumption sets are always sets of default literals A such that no rule for A exists in P (a very common simplifying case). In order to make minimal changes that preserve indissociability of literals 10 we de ne:
De nition 2.14 (Minimal contradiction removal sets). Let 
Contradiction Free Programs
In this section we show that for each contradiction removal set there is a non{contradictory program obtained from the original one by a simple update, and based on these programs we de ne the CRSX semantics. 10 A class of literals identi ed by the CRSX theory which do not appear in any examples in this paper. Informally, indissociable literals are those that depend only on each other (as in positive loops), so that their truth value must always be the same. In 29] it is shown that it is impossible to change the truth value of one without changing the truth value of another. See the appendix for the formal de nition as well as examples. De nition 2.18 (CRSX Semantics). Given a revisable contradictory program P let CRS i be any contradiction removal set for P. An interpretation I is a CRSX model of P i :
The least (w.r.t. ) CRSX model of P is called the CRWFM model 12 .
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This rule can be seen as the productive integrity constraint A: In fact, since the WF Semantics implicitly has in it the productive constraint A; A, the inhibition rule can be seen as the minimal way of expressing by means of a program rule that A leads to an inconsistency, and forcing A not to be false. 12 In 29] it is proven that this model always exists.
The contradiction removal semantics for logic programs extended with explicit negation is de ned by the models satisfying equation (3), which represent the di erent forms of revising a contradictory program.
Equation (3) says that the revised models of a revisable contradictory program are expressed as models of revised programs (using some contradiction removal set) when WFSX semantics is used.
Example 8. (cont.)For program P 1 the only assumption set is AS = f bg. Thus the only CRS is f bg; and the only CRSX model is f:a; a; cg.
For program P 2 the only assumption set is AS 2 = f cg: Thus the only CRS is f cg; and the only CRSX model is f:a; ag. 2 
Summary of our representation method
In this section we summarize and systematize the representation method adopted in all examples in the sequel. The type of rules for which we propose a representation is, in our view, general enough to capture a wide domain of non{monotonic problems. Each type of rule is described in a subsection by means of a schema in natural language and its corresponding representation rule. Exceptions to Defeasible Rules Under certain conditions COND there are exceptions to the defeasible rule H 1 B 1 ; ab 1 : ab 1 COND: As an example, the representation of the exception "Penguins are exceptions to the "normally birds y" rule (i.e. rule f b; abb)" is:
abb penguin:
Preference rules are a special kind of exception to defeasible rules:
Preference Rules Under conditions COND, prefer to apply the defeasible rule H 1 B 1 ; ab 1 instead of the defeasible rule H 2 B 2 ; ab 2 . ab 1 COND; ab 2 : As an example consider "For penguins, if the rule that says "normally penguins don't y" is applicable then inhibit the "normally birds y" rule". This is represented as: ab b penguin(X); ab penguin(X):
Unknown Possible Fact F might be true or not (in other words, the possibility or otherwise of F should be considered). 
Defeasible Reasoning
In this section we show how to represent defeasible reasoning with logic programs extended with explicit negation. We want to express defeasible reasoning and give a meaning to sets of rules, (some of them being defeasible) when contradiction arises from the application of the defeasible rules. In this case we suggest how to explicitly represent exceptions and preference rules. We do not intend to address the problem of automatic generation of exception rules or preference rules 13 in order to restore consistency, but only to show how exceptions and preferences may be represented in the language. For instance, we want to represent defeasible rules such as birds normally y and penguins normally don't y. Given a penguin, which is a bird, we adopt the skeptical point of view and none of the con icting rules applies. Later on we show how to express preference for one rule over another in case they con ict and both are applicable. Consider for the moment a simpler version of this problem:
Example 13. Consider the statements: :f(X)
(iv) Since there are no rules for ab(a), ab(a) holds and f(a) follows. On the other hand we have p(a) and :f(a) follows from rule (ii). Thus M P is contradictory. In this case we argue that the rst rule gives rise to a contradiction depending on a CWA on ab(a) and so must not conclude f(a): The intended meaning requires :f(a) and f(a). We say that in this case a revision occurs in the CWA of predicate instance ab(a), which must turn to be unde ned. f(a) follows from :f(a) in the semantics.
In this case CRSX identi es one contradiction removal set CRS = f ab(a)g. The corresponding contradiction free program is P fab(a) ab(a)g, and the corresponding CRWFM is fp(a); :p(a); b(a); :b(a); :f(a); f(a); :ab(a)g: 2
In the example above the revision process is simple and the information to be revised is clearly the CWA about the abnormality predicate, and something can be said about a ying. However this is not always the case, as shown in the following example: :f(X)
:f(c) Remark 5.1. In program P above the facts and rule (iii) play the rôle of non{defeasible information, and should hold whichever the world view one may choose for the interpretation of P together with those facts.
About the bird b everything is well de ned and we have: ) which says that bird b ies, f(b), and it can't be shown it is a penguin, p(b). This is the intuitive result, since we may believe that b ies (because it is a bird) and it is not known to be a penguin, and so rules (i) and (ii) are non{contradictory w.r.t. bird b.
About the penguin a use of rules (i) and ( A contradiction arises about penguin a (f(a) and :f(a) both hold) because of the (closed world) assumptions on ab 1 (a) and ab 2 (a), thus suggesting that the contradiction removal set is CRS = f ab 1 (a); ab 2 (a)g.
Let us determine formally the CRS we presented above. The unique contradiction arising is due to penguin a, so it is enough to consider dependency sets concerning a:
The pseudo model M P of P contains ff(a) Let us check that M P CRS 3 is a CRXSM model of P. Factorization P CRS 3 =M P CRS 3 yields:
and P CRS (M P CRS ) = M P CRS : 2
Exceptions
In general we may want to say that a given element is an exception to a normality rule. The notion of exception may be expressed in two di erent ways. This is a simpli ed version of example 13.
Exceptions to predicates
Note that nothing is said about ab(a), i.e. the CWA on ab(a) is avoided (f ab(a)g is the CRS) since it would give rise to a contradiction on flies(a): This is the case where we know that bird a is an exception to the normally birds y rule, by observation of the fact that it does not y: :flies(a):
Exceptions to rules
A di erent way to express that a given animal is some exception is to say that a given rule must not be applicable to the animal. To state that an element is an exception to a speci c rule rather than to its conclusion predicate (more than one rule may have the same conclusion), we state that the element is abnormal w.r.t. the rule, i.e. the rule is not applicable to the element: if element a is an exception to the ying birds rule we express it as ab(a).
In general we may want to express that a given X is abnormal under certain conditions. This is the case where we want to express penguins are abnormal w.r.t. the ying birds rule above, as follows:
Remark 5.2. Rule (4) together with the non{defeasible rule bird(X) penguin(X) add that penguins are birds which are abnormal w.r.t. ying.
Similarly of dead birds; i.e.
ab(X) bird(X); dead(X)
adding that dead birds are abnormal w.r.t. ying.
Remark 5.3. Alternatively, given :flies(X) dead(X), the non{abnormality of dead bird a w.r.t. ying, i.e. ab(a), may not be consistently assumed since it leads to a contradiction regarding flies(a) and :flies(a):
Exceptions to exceptions
In general we may extend the notion of exceptioned rules to exception rules themselves, i.e. exception rules may be defeasible. This will allow us to express an exception to the exception rule for birds to y, and hence the possibility that an exceptional penguin may y, or that a dead bird may y. In this case we want to say that the exception rule is itself a defeasible rule:
ab(X) bird(X); dead(X); ab deadbird(X)
Preferences among rules
We may express now preference between two rules, stating that if one rule may be used, that constitutes an exception to the use of the other rule:
Example 16. Consider again the ying birds example:
In some cases we want to apply the most speci c information; above, there should be (since a penguin is a speci c kind of bird) an explicit preference of the non{ ying penguins rule over the ying birds rule:
If we have also penguin(a) and bird(b) the unique model contains:
Rule (5) says that if a given penguin is not abnormal w.r.t. non{ ying then it must be considered abnormal w.r.t. ying. In this case we infer that b is a ying bird, and a is a penguin and also a bird, and there is no evidence (assume it is false) that it ies f(a):
Representation of Hierarchical Taxonomies
In this section we illustrate how to represent taxonomies with logic programs with explicit negation. In this representation we wish to express general absolute (i.e. non{ defeasible) rules, defeasible rules, exceptions to defeasible rules, as well as exceptions to exceptions, explicitly making preferences among defeasible rules. As we've seen, when defeasible rules contradict each other and no preference rule is present, none of them is considered applicable in the most skeptical reading. We want to be able to express preference for one defeasible rule over another whenever they con ict. In taxonomic hierarchies we wish to express that in the presence of contradictory defeasible rules we prefer the one with most speci c 16 information (e.g. for a penguin, which is a bird, we want to conclude that it doesn't y). animal(X) mammal(X) (1) mammal(X) bat(X) (2) animal(X) bird(X) (3) bird(X) penguin(X) (4) animal(X) dead animal(X) (5) :flies(X) animal(X); ab 1 (X) (6) flies(X) bat(X); ab 2 (X) (7) flies(X) bird(X); ab 3 (X) (8) :flies(X) penguin(X); ab 4 (X) (9) :flies(X) dead animal(X); ab 5 (X) (10) mammal(pluto) (11) bird(tweety) (12) penguin(joe) (13) bat(dracula) (14) dead animal(dracula) (15) with the implicit hierarchical preference rules (not shown in g. 1): ab 1 (X) bat(X); ab 2 (X) ab 1 (X) bird(X); ab 3 (X) ab 3 (X) penguin(X); ab 4 (X) and the explicit problem statement preferences: ab 2 (X) dead animal(X); bat(X); ab 5 (X) (16) ab 3 (X) dead animal(X); bird(X); ab 5 (X) (17) ab 5 (dracula) (18) As expected, this program has exactly one model (coinciding with the minimal WFSX model), which is non{contradictory, no choice being possible and everything being de ned in the hierarchy. The model is given by the table in gure 2 where p means that the predicate (in the row entry) is true about the element (in the column entry), e.g. penguin(joe) holds in the model.
Thus pluto doesn't y, and isn't an exception to any of the rules; tweety ies because it's a bird and an exception to the "animals don't y" rule; joe doesn't y because it's a penguin and an exception to the "birds y" rule.
Note that although dracula is a dead animal, which by default don't y (cf. rule (10)) it is also considered an exception to this very same rule. Furthermore rule (16) saying that \dead bats normally do not y" is also exceptioned by dracula and thus the \bats y" rule applies and dracula ies. Note that preferences rules must be present in 
Hypothetical Reasoning
In this section we capture hypothetical reasoning in CRSX and interpret the results. In hierarchies everything is de ned as seen, leaving no choices available (a unique model is identi ed as the meaning of the program). This is not the case in hypothetical reasoning situations.
The birds world
In example 13 we showed that the cautious or skeptical revision of defeasible rules gives a minimal model where no defeasible rule is used. There are however two other (non{ minimal) models corresponding to alternative (non{cautious or hypothetical) meanings of the program (corresponding to alternative defeasible rules being applied or, equivalently, alternative revisions) when di erent assumptions are made. :f(X)
Here we may consider two alternative hypothetical worlds (note there is no preference rule present). In one of them (model M 1 ) we consider the hypothesis that a is not an abnormal bird, ab 1 (a), and so it ies, f(a). In this case we must also assume that ab 2 Another way of interpreting these rules is by saying that if we hypothesize that, say rule (ii) has an exception in a, in the sense that ab 2 (a) ab 2 (a) viz. ab 2 (a) cannot hold, then f(a) holds; i.e. P fab 2 (a) ab 2 (a)g j = M P f(a):
Compare model M 2 above with the unique model where an explicit preference was made (c.f. section 5.2 in page 22).
Hypothetical facts and rules
In some cases we want to be make a rule hypothetically applicable, in the sense that we may consider the case where the rule is used to reason with, as well as the case where the rule is not considered in force. The same is desired of some facts, i.e. we wnat to be able to explicitly represent that some unknown fact may be hypothesized true as well as false. If no hypothesis is made about the fact the information it conveys is unknown or undecided, just like the conclusion of a hypothetical rule which is not hypothesized.
Hypothetical facts
Similarly to rules about which we are undecided regarding their applicability, we might be unsure about some facts. Note that this is di erent from not having any knowledge at all about such a fact. Consider this simple example: and expresses exactly what is intended, i.e. John and Nixon are quakers, John is a paci st and we don't have reason to believe Nixon is a paci st, in this or any other model (there aren't any others in fact). Now suppose we want to add: Nixon might be a pacifist (6) In our view we wouldn't want in this case to be so strong as to a rm pacifist(nixon), thereby not allowing for the possibility of Nixon not being a paci st. What we are prepared to say is that Nixon might be a paci st if we don't have reason to believe he isn't and, vice-versa, that Nixon might be a non{paci st if we don't have reason to believe he isn't one. Statement (6) is expressed as: pacifist(nixon)
:pacifist(nixon) (7) :pacifist(nixon) pacifist(nixon) (8) The rst rule states that Nixon is a paci st if there is no evidence against it. The second rule makes a symmetric statement. Let P 2 be the program P together with these rules. P 2 has a minimal model M P 2 (which is non{contradictory): 8 > > > < > > > :
: quaker(nixon) : quaker(john) : pacifist(john)
and two more XMs:
which is the result we were seeking. Statements of the form of (6) we call unknown possible facts, and are expressed as by (7) and (8) . They can be read as a fact and its negation, each of which can be assumed only if it is consistent to do so.
Hypothetical rules
Consider now the well known nixon{diamond example using now hypothetical rules instead of defeasible ones. We represent these rules as named rules (in the fashion of 35]) where the rule name may be present in one model as true, and in others as false.
Normally quakers are paci sts.
Normally republicans are hawks. Paci sts are non hawks.
Hawks are non paci sts. Nixon is a quaker and a republican. Paci sts are non hawks. There are other republicans.
There are other quakers.
The corresponding logic program is:
republican ( pac(a rep), :hawk(a rep) g M 2 = M 1 fhyprh(n); :hyprh(n); hawk(n); :hawk(n);:pac(n); pac(n)g M 3 = M 1 f:hypqp(n); hypqp(n); pac(n); :hawk(n)g M 4 = M 1 f:hyprh(n); hyprh(n); hawk(n); :pac(n)g M 5 = M 1 fhypqp(n); :hypqp(n); pac(n); :pac(n); :hawk(n); hawk(n)g M 6 = M 2 f:hypqp(n); hypqp(n); pac(n); :hawk(n)g M 7 = M 4 fhypqp(n); :hypqp(n); pac(n); :pac(n); :hawk(n)g M 8 = M 3 f:hyprh(n); hyprh(n); hawk(n); :pac(n)g M 1 being the most skeptical one. Edge labels represent the hypothesis being made when going from one model to another.
Note that possible rules are di erent from defeasible rules. Defeasible rules are applied "whenever possible" unless they lead to a contradiction. Possible rules provide equally plausible alternative extensions. In the most cautious model no hypotheses are made about the applicability of normality rules. A model exists considering the applicability of the republicans are hawks normality rule as well as another model (M 3 ) considering the non{use of it. Note that M 1 and M 3 di er precisely in the way the rule is interpreted. In some sense M 3 is a model where the normality rule is not considered at all while in M 1 although the rule is considered, it is not applied since there are other equally applicable rules which together with it would give rise to an inconsistency. Remark 7.2. Note that with this form of representation we might as well add abqp or :abqp, and thus the treatment of explicit negative information becomes similar to that of positive information. In this case we may now hypothesize about the applicability and non{applicability of each normality rule. However, the most skeptical model (where no hypotheses are made) is still identical to the one where normality rules were interpreted as defeasible rules, the di erence being that in this case revision is enforced since the M P model is non{contradictory.
In this form of representation of the nixon{diamond problem there is no need for revision since all models are non{contradictory.
Application to Reasoning about Actions
We now apply the programing methodology described above to some reasoning about action problems and show that it gives correct results. The situation calculus notation 23] is used, where predicate holds(P; S) expresses that property or uent P holds in situation S; predicate normal(P; E; S) expresses that in situation S, event or action E does not normally a ect the truth value of uent P; the term result(E; S) names the situation resulting from the occurrence of event E in situation S:
The Yale Shooting Problem
This problem, supplied in 10], will be represented in a form nearer to the one suggested in 18].
Example 19. The problem and its formulation are as follows:
Initially (in situation s0) a person is alive: holds(alive; s0).
After loading a gun the gun is loaded: holds(loaded; result(load; S)). If the gun is loaded then after shooting it the person will not be alive.
:holds(alive; result(shoot; S)) holds(loaded; S):
After an event things normally remain as they were (frame axioms), i.e.:
{ properties which hold before will normally still hold after the event:
holds(P; result(E; S)) holds(P; S); ab(P; E; S) (pp) 17 { properties which do not hold before the event will normally not hold afterwards as well:
:holds(P; result(E; S)) :holds(P; S); ab(:P; E; S) (np) 18 Consider the question "What holds and what doesn't hold after the loading of a gun, a period of waiting, and a shooting ?" represented as two queries: holds(P; result(shoot; result(wait; result(load; s0)))) :holds(P; result(shoot; result(wait; result(load; s0)))) 17 pp stands for positive persistence. Now the M P model contains :holds(loaded; s3). This means that in M P we have no proof that the gun is not loaded. This is acceptable because there is no evidence for it to be unloaded. All other properties are unknown in M P : The rules above state that it is equally possible for load to be abnormal with respect to the wait event, as well as to be non{abnormal. We have two XMs corresponding to the two extensions. Example 21. The assumption of problem D2 and its representation are as follows:
After an action is performed things normally remain as they were:
holds(P; result(E; S)) holds(P; S); ab(P; E; S) (pp)
:holds(P; result(E; S)) :holds(P; S); ab(:P; E; S) (np)
When the robot grasps a block, the block will normally be in the hand:
holds(hand(B); result(grasp(B); S)) ab(hand(B); grasp(B); S)
When the robot moves a block onto the table, the block will normally be on the The conclusion "After the robot grasps block a, waits, and then moves it onto the table, the block will be on the table" can be represented by:
holds(table(a); result(move(a); result(wait; result(grasp(a); s0)))) and belongs to the M P model of the program. 2 Example 22. The assumptions of problem D6 are those of D2 plus "After the robot performed two actions, a was on the table". The conclusion is "The rst action was grasping a, and the second was moving it onto the 
Related work
In this section we compare our approach with other logic programming proposals. Since the underlying semantics is di erent from that of other approaches 20 we focus the discussion from the point of view of dealing with inconsistency and representing defeasible reasoning. 13] is a survey of abductive reasoning in logic programming.
When making assumptions (introduced by some non{monotonic reasoning formalism), inconsistency may arise. Some approaches have been proposed recently to deal with inconsistency. One common goal to those approaches is the identi cation of maximum consistent assumption sets. Several techniques have been suggested to solve this goal.
The technique we follow goes along the lines presented in 44]
21
, which roughly starts by considering every consequence of a program even those raising contradictions. In our approach we consider then dependency information, for the special atom ? to de ne the set of revisable literals, and indentify sets of negative assumptions (assumption sets) which may not be held together (contradiction removal sets). In 44] the disjunctive normal form of a formula is de ned and, together with dependency information a model is identi ed as the meaning of the program.
Dung 3] studies also the problem of restoring consistency of extended logic programs (with two forms of negation), in the well founded semantics. He applies a preferred 20 For a comparison regarding the underlying semantics and other semantics refer to 1]. 21 Although the approach suggested here and presented as a natural deduction system contains two forms of negation the semantics are however di erent. An alternative approach to restoring consistency starts from the set of consequences of the (inconsistent) theory and retracts literals until consistency is restored. This is the approach followed in 9, 17, 29] .
Exploring the relation between truth{maintenance systems and logic programming, Giordano and Martelli 8] suggest to identify the (stable model) semantics of a logic program with integrity constraints as the semantics of a transformed logic program, without integrity constraints, using all the contrapositive variants of the original program rules. The idea of using the contrapositives is also explored by Jonker 12] but considering the well founded-semantics.
Satoh and Iwayama 41] use TMS techniques to maintain consistency while computing stable models of general logic programs with integrity constraints, and apply it to compute abduction in an abductive framework (c.f. 4, 15] ).
In 18] Kowalski et al. suggest an extension (e{answer sets) based on stable model semantics, dealing with two forms of negation. In the semantics suggested therein there is an a priori explicit commitment to giving preference to negative information (exceptions) over positive information. In our present approach we showed that there is no need to make such a commitment at the semantic level (actually we argue that it is too strong), and that preferences can be represented instead explicitly at the language level. This stance was already adopted by the present authors previously in a di erent semantics 34], and independently by Inoue in 11]. Moreover, the ability to state preferences at the language level provides a more general mechanism for dealing with preferences. Dealing with preferences at the language level provides a greater modularity (in the sense that it is enough to consider local changes in the new program) when introducing new preference rules into an existing logic program.
Because of its inherent asymmetry, the "rules with exceptions" approach 18] requires changing previous rules in the program each time an exception to an exception is made, because head literals need to change. For instance, a three level hierarchy of birds, penguins and ying penguins requires rules like fly(X) bird(X) nofly(X) penguin(X) fly(X) flying penguin(X) and the exceptions:
:fly(X) nofly(X) :nofly(X) flying penguin(X)
We allow both positive and negative conclusions in rules, inclusively for the same predicate.
The extension of well founded semantics to explicit negation provides a (non contradictory) well founded model of de nite conclusions in cases where e-answer set semantics provides only alternative models. For instance, in the paci st/hawk example we obtain a well founded model containing the facts fquaker; republicang, besides the two alternative e-answer sets.
A. CRSX Review
De nition A.1 (The x operator). Let P be a logic program and J a p{interpretation. The operator x J : I! I on the set I of all 3-valued p{interpretations of P is de ned as follows: If I 2 I is a p{interpretation of P and A is a ground classical literal then The non{minimal models satisfying (9) above (pseudo) Extended Models (XMs for short). To compute the p{model M P we de ne the following trans nite sequence fI g of xed points: 22 Recall 36] that the F-least interpretation used to compute the least xed point of x J "w is H P .
I 0 = h;; ;i I +1 = x (I ) = x I "w I = S < I for limit ordinal Equivalently, the pseudo well founded model M P of P is the F{least xed point of (9) This suggests that in order to get revised non{contradictory consistent models we must know where contradiction arises from and prevent it.
The least 3-valued model of a non-negative program can be de ned as the least xpoint of the following generalization of the van Emden{Kowalski least model operator for de nite logic programs:
De nition A.5 ( operator). Suppose that P is a non-negative program, I is an interpretation of P and A is a ground atom. Then (I) is an interpretation de ned as follows: (I)(A) = 1 i there is a rule A A 1 ; : : : ; A n in P such that I(A i ) = 1 for all i n.
(I)(A) = 0 i for every rule A A 1 ; : : : ; A n there is an i n such that I(A i ) = 0.
